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1.  Introduction 
 
The principal focus of this paper is to study carrier pricing decisions for a new type of 
vehicle routing problems defined in a competitive and dynamic environment. This class 
of problems is best introduced in the context of the evolution of the freight 
transportation industry (deregulation) in the 80s and the explosive growth of the 
information and communication industries in the 90s. 
 
The transportation industry became highly competitive in the US after the US Congress 
passed motor carrier deregulation legislation in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  As a 
result, competition in the trucking industry is fierce, aided by relatively low capital 
entry requirements (especially in the truckload (TL) sector), and reflected in the large 
number of trucking companies  (Coyle et al., 2000). Operating ratios as tight as 0.95 
(allowing just 5 cents per dollar earned to cover fixed costs, interest cost, and return to 
owners/taxes) are considered standard for TL companies  (TCA, 2003). 
 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) are reducing pre- and post-
transaction costs such as search, communication, quote request/preparation, and 
monetary exchanges. Ubiquitous and reliable communication networks are allowing 
physical decentralization of decision-making processes while connecting market agents 
in real time. As transaction time, cost, and effort reductions take place, sourcing and 
procurement strategies adjust to the new market environment (Dai and Kauffman, 
2002). The side-effect of cheaper and improved market information, as well as higher  
transparency, can lead to increased competition (Zhu, 2004).  
 
In a competitive transportation market, carriers typically face two distinct, though 
interrelated, decision problems: (1) a cost minimization problem (operating the fleet in 
the most efficient manner) and (2) an incremental cost and price determination problem 
(needed for contract tendering). The first type of problem is best described in the 
Operations Research (OR) literature by the family of problems widely known as 
Vehicle Routing Problems (VRP).  The second type of problem, despite its significance 
in competitive markets, has not received as much attention in the OR and vehicle 
routing literature, but is gaining traction in the Operations Management literature under 
the growing sub-area of Revenue Management.  
 
In order to study carriers’ pricing in a competitive transportation market, this paper 
introduces the Vehicle Routing Problem in a Competitive Environment (VRPCE), as an 
extension of the Traveling Salesman Problem with Profits (TSPP) to a dynamic 
competitive auction environment. In the VRPCE, the carrier must estimate the 
incremental cost of servicing new service requests as they arrive dynamically. The 
paper presents a rigorous and precise treatment of the sequential pricing and costing 
problem that a carrier faces in such an environment.  The sequential pricing problem 
presented here is an intrinsic feature of a sequential auction problem.  In addition to 
introducing the formulation of this class of problems and discussing the main sources of 
difficulty in devising a solution, a simple example is constructed to show that carriers’ 
prices under first price auction payment rules do not necessarily reflect the cost of 
servicing transportation requests.  An approximate solution approach with a finite look-
ahead horizon is presented and illustrated through numerical experiments, in 
competition with a static approach with no look-ahead. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a literature review of the relevant 
VRP literature. Section 2 describes the VRPCE and introduces the mathematical 
notation necessary to describe the problem. Mathematical properties of pricing inherent 
to the VRPCE are shown and discussed in Section 3. Section 4 illustrates the equations 
and calculation process for a VRPCE example. Section 5 considers pricing with 
alternative payment (reward) mechanisms. Section 6 discusses the computational 
complexity of the VRPCE, proposes a simplified heuristic procedure, and analyzes its 
properties via simulation results. Section 7 reviews key informational and behavioral 
assumptions of the VRPCE, and is followed by concluding comments in a final section.  
 
2.  VRP Background Review 
 
The goal of this section is to place the VRPCE in context of the main known classes of 
the VRP, and not to provide a comprehensive review of the extensive literature related 
to the VRP.  
 
First introduced by Dantzig and Ramsey (1959), in what they called the truck 
dispatching problem, the VRP was formulated as an offshoot of the Traveling Salesman 
Problem (TSP) to capture multiple vehicles (with and without capacity constraints) and 
routes. Among many other extensions, widely encountered is the time-windows VRP 
(Solomon and Desrosiers, 1988), where the objective is to build up routes that minimize 
total distance while satisfying all customers’ time windows. Other extensions include 
heterogeneous fleet capacity, compatibility constraints between 
vehicles/cargo/customers, pick-up and delivery problems, several depots, driver-related 
constraints (maximum number of driving hours or mandatory rests), and generalized 
cost functions (combination of distance, time driven, and vehicle type). A thorough and 
comprehensive review of deterministic and static problems can be found in Toth and 
Vigo (2001).  
 
Problems where customers (demand) or travel (service) times are not deterministic give 
rise to stochastic versions of the VRP.  Jaillet (1988) introduced the a priori solution 
approach to the probabilistic TSP with stochastic customer requests (when the truck 
leaves the depot, there is uncertainty regarding what set of customers have to be served), 
later generalized to the VRP with stochastic customers and demand (Gendreau et al., 
1996, Bertsimas et al., 1990, Jaillet and Odoni, 1988). Stochastic travel times in vehicle 
routing problems were introduced in Stewart and Golden (1983) and analyzed further in 
Laporte et al. (1992) under general stochastic programming formulations (e.g. using 
chance constraints). Laporte and Louveaux (1993) presented an L-shape solution for the 
stochastic integer program with complete recourse and first stage binary variables. 
Powell (1996) developed a stochastic formulation for the dynamic vehicle dispatching 
problem. Powell et al. (1995) present an extensive discussion of dynamic network 
modeling problems that arise in logistics and distribution systems, including a-priori 
optimization and on-line decision policies for stochastic routing problems.  
 
A common objective found throughout the literature is to minimize transportation costs, 
generally in regard to empty distance, driving time, or a combination of distance and 
time. Though costing is part of any dynamic problem (costs are implicitly considered 
since current decisions affect the cost of serving future shipments), costing and pricing 
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are usually not an explicit part of VRP (deterministic, stochastic, or dynamic) 
formulations. 
 
Profits are explicitly considered in the “Traveling Salesman Problem with Profits” or 
TSPP, as stated by Feillet et al. (2005) in a comprehensive survey.  These TSPP 
problems can be divided into three categories according to Feillet et al. (2005): (a) profit 
tour problems (PTP), (b) orienteering problems (OP), and (c) prize–collecting TSPs 
(PCTSP). These problems not only include a known profit for visiting a customer/city 
but also relax the condition that every customer must be visited.  In the PTP 
(Dell'Amico et al., 1995) the objective is to find a TSP tour that maximizes total 
collected profits minus travel costs. The OP (Golden et al., 1987) is similar to the PTP, 
with a constraint on total travel or cost. Finally, the PCTSP (Balas, 1989) is similar to 
the PTP but with a constraint on the amount of profit that must be collected in a tour.  
 
Dynamic fleet management problems where the decision variables are assignment of 
vehicles (resources) to shipments (tasks) have also been studied in the literature. In 
these problems, repositioning costs and rewards are known while the arrival of 
shipments or tasks follows a stochastic process. Efficient approximations of the 
resulting concave dynamic program value function have been proposed by Topaloglu 
and Powell (2003). The effectiveness and computational complexity of the 
approximations are problem-dependent. For example, problems with homogenous 
vehicle types and one period shipment service times can be efficiently approximated 
with a piecewise linear function that provides integer solutions (Godfrey and Powell, 
2002), whereas problems with heterogeneous vehicle types and multi-period service 
times require more elaborate approaches (Topaloglu and Powell, 2002).  
 
Another line of research that explicitly includes profits and routing problems is the work 
on sequential auctions for transportation, where contracts (shipments) dynamically 
arrive to a marketplace and carriers compete for them in a sequence of one-shipment 
auctions. These sequential auctions enable the sale of cargo capacity based mainly on 
price, yet still satisfy customer level of service demands. Figliozzi et al. (2003b)  
present a framework to study transportation marketplaces. These authors also evaluate 
the competitiveness of different vehicle routing strategies (Figliozzi et al., 2004)  and 
study the effect of bid learning mechanisms and auction settings on the performance of 
the transportation marketplace (Figliozzi et al., 2005). Figliozzi (2004) suggests a game 
theoretic equilibrium formulation of the decision problems faced by the carriers 
(bidders) and, recognizing the intractability of that formulation, proposes a boundedly 
rational approach to study carriers’ behavior and bidding.  
 
The VRPCE, introduced in this paper, generalizes the TSPP to a dynamic environment, 
and presents a rigorous and precise treatment of the sequential pricing and costing 
problem that a carrier faces in a dynamic environment. The sequential pricing problem 
presented here is an intrinsic feature of a sequential auction problem, which also 
typically includes, beyond pricing and costing, strategic game theoretic elements that 
are needed to represent a general auction process.  
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3.  VRPCE Conceptual Description and Mathematical 
Framework  
 
The VRPCE is an extension of TSPP problems to a dynamic environment where 
customer arrivals/characteristics have some degree of uncertainty and the service cost 
must be estimated before the carrier decides to serve or compete for an arriving request. 
There are five main characteristics of a VRPCE:  (a) the vehicle routing problem is 
dynamic, i.e. service requests/contracts arrive over time;  (b) there is a degree of 
uncertainty about customer requests, arrival times, and characteristics;  (c) carriers must 
dynamically estimate the incremental cost or price of servicing a new request/contract;  
(d) each service provided has a monetary reward which is uncertain at the time of 
estimating the cost; and (e) the carrier’s profit depends on the reward obtained and on 
how effectively the fleet is managed  (service/travel costs or resources spent to service 
customers).  
 
The VRPCE is a variation of the VRP because service costs are route and schedule 
dependent (a). The type of VRP (capacitated, with time windows, etc) is not essential in 
the general formulation for the VRPCE presented in this paper, though it is highly 
relevant when the specific routing problems have to be solved (Section 6).  The problem 
is essentially dynamic and stochastic (b), otherwise the problem is a version of the 
already mentioned static TSPP.  The accuracy needed to estimate service costs or prices 
(c) depends on whether the reward (d) to be obtained is known (acceptance/rejection 
problem) or unknown (cost/pricing problem). Known-reward problems can be easier to 
solve since establishing lower/upper bounds can be computationally simpler.  Regarding 
rewards (e), the VRPCE is similar to the PTP, but the rewards are unknown for requests 
that have not been yet awarded (the rewards depend on competitors’ prices as in second 
price auctions).  
 
Consider a carrier in a transportation marketplace where the carrier has to prevail in 
price in order to acquire the right to serve any given shipper. Shippers announce 
contracts on an ongoing basis. Each contract may consist of one or several shipments 
that the chosen carrier will have to serve; only one price can be submitted as a bid per 
contract1.  
 
Let the contract arrival/announcement epochs be 1 2{ , ,..., }Nt t t  such that 10 t<  
and 1i it t +< . We assume that contracts are tendered and awarded in real time, thus 
precluding carriers from pricing more than one contract at the same time. Let 
jt represent the time when contract js  arrives and the carrier tenders a price jb R∈ . 
After each contract offering, the carrier receives feedback jy  regarding the outcome of 
the offering. The public information known at the time of the offering for contract js  
is 0 1 2 1( , , ,..., )j jh h y y y −= , where 0h  denotes the information known by all carriers at 
time 0 0t =  (with 0 1t t< ) before bidding for contract 1s . Similarly, the information 
                                                 
1 The limitation is on one price for a contract as a whole, therefore disallowing contract splitting or combinatorial 
pricing 
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known at a time t  with 1j jt t t− < ≤  is 0 1 2 1( , , ,..., )t jh h y y y −= . Again, the information 
1 0 1 2 1( , , ,..., , )j j jh h y y y y+ −=  is assumed known at any time t  with 1j jt t t +< ≤ , and so 
on. The amount and quality of feedback information received will depend on the 
particulars of the market rules, as discussed in Section 6.  
 
Arrival times and contract characteristics are not known in advance. They are assumed 
to come from a probability space ( , , )Ω F P , with outcomes 1 2{ , ,..., }Nω ω ω . Any 
arriving contract js  represents a realization at time jt  from the aforementioned 
probability space, therefore { , }j j jt sω = . Let 1 2{ , ,..., } SNs s s =  be the set of arriving 
contracts. Note that we do not assume that the total number of requests be known in 
advance; it is simply assumed that the carrier will know, at the time of its arrival, that a 
given contract will be the last one. The level of carrier competition is represented by a 
random variable ξ , whose successive realizations 1( )j j Nξ ≤ ≤  represent the best prices 
offered by the competition and/or the reservation prices of the shippers, whichever is 
least, during the N  successive contract offerings. If a request/contract cannot be served 
and is rejected (all bids above the reservation price) the request is assumed served by 
alternative means. The carrier gains the right to serve contract js  if j jb ξ< ; if j jb ξ=  
contract js  is awarded to the carrier with a known probability
2.  
 
A central assumption of this VRPCE formulation is that the carrier believes that the 
future level of contract price competition is not influenced by his past, present, or future 
actions (price or fleet management related). The market clearing set-up is equivalent to 
the clearing rules of a sequential second price auction, so if the carrier wins the right to 
serve contract js  then this carrier is paid an amount jξ . There are no participation costs 
or penalties for losing an offering.  
 
The fleet status at time t  is denoted as tz , which comprises two different sets: set of 
vehicles with their status updated to time t  and set of contracts acquired but not yet 
served up to time t .  The fleet status at time jt , when contract js  arrives, will be 
denoted as jz . Note that the set jz  does not include information on the just arrived 
contract js . Let jI  be the indicator variable for shipment js , such that 1jI =  if the 
carrier has secured the offering for contract js  and 0jI =  otherwise. As contracts are 
tendered and awarded in real time, the status of the fleet updated with the tender result 
is denoted |j jz I . To shorten notation, a superscript “1” will indicate that the contract 
was won; a superscript “0” indicates that the contract was lost. Then, the updates states 
are 1 |( 1)j j jz z I= =  and 0 |( 0)j j jz z I= =  respectively. If a carrier is submitting a tender 
for contract js  at time jt , the symbol “-” is used to represent the previous successful 
tender as time jt −  (the last tender won by the carrier before time jt ). For the particular 
case of 1s  or for a carrier with no wins up to time jt  we use 0t  as the previous 
                                                 
2 This probability will depend on market settings such as the number of competitors and shipper’s policy regarding 
the assignment of contracts when the reservation price is met.  
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successful tender.  The updated fleet status immediately after winning the contract that 
arrived at time jt −  is denoted
1
jz − ; in particular if 0jt t− =  then 1 0jz z− = .  
 
It is assumed that the fleet status at a given time is a function of time, previous fleet 
status, and history up to the previous epoch; travel and service times are assumed 
deterministic.  This can be expressed by assuming the existence of a state/assignment 
function such that the status of the carrier when shipment js  arrives is 1a( , , )j j j jz t h z −=  
or in general a( , , )t t jz t h z=  for any 1j jt t t +< ≤ .   
 
The distance or cost incurred by the fleet from time jt  up to time t  using assignment 
function a  with initial status 1jz  is denoted
1d(a, , )jz t . Let 
'
jt  be the time at which the 
carrier serves completely all the contracts in 1jz . As distance (or time) costs cannot be 
negative, it follows that 1d(a, , )jz t  is a nondecreasing function: 
 
     - for 1, d(a, , ) 0j jt t z t< = ,  
 
    -  for ' 1 1 ', d(a, , ) d(a, , )j j j jt t z t z t> = , and  
 
- for 'j jt t t≤ ≤  it is a nondecreasing function.  
-  
At time jt , the incremental cost of serving contract js  up to time jt t≥   is estimated 
using: 
 
1 1 1( , ) d(a, , ) {d(a, , ) d(a, , )}j j j j jc s t z t z t z t− −= − − . The price DVRCE problem consists of 
determining the price for each arriving shipment js ; this problem is analyzed in the next 
section.   
 
4.  Price DVRCE 
 
The price DVRCE problem can be formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming 
problem where: each stage is defined by the arrival of a new contract, price is the 
decision variable, and the state transitions are determined by the contract award and 
fleet assignment processes. In this section we assume that a fleet deployment process 
can only be changed or interrupted by winning a new contract. In particular, at time jt , 
the full incremental cost of serving contract js  is denoted as
3: 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 In general, earlier deployment schedules with fewer contracts finish earlier. It is assumed without loss of generality 
that ' 'j jt t−≥ , otherwise this expression should be used with 'jt  replaced by ' ' 'max( , )j j jt t t−=  
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' 1 ' 1 ' 1 1 ' 0 '( ) ( , ) d(a, , ) {d(a, , ) d(a, , )} d(a, , ) d(a, , )j j j j j j j j j j j j jc s c s t z t z t z t z t z t− −= = − − = −  
 
Since the price DVRCE problem is a stochastic dynamic programming problem, we 
could solve it using backward induction. The carrier pricing the last contract Ns  at 
time Nt  is in a situation strategically similar to a one-item second price auction because: 
(a) the carrier’s reward depends on the realization of the price competition  for 
contract js  which is jξ , (b) this reward jξ  is independent of any action taken by the 
carrier,  and (c) the carrier wins the right to serve contract js  if j jb ξ< ; if j jb ξ=  the 
right to serve the contract is obtained with a known probability dependent on market 
settings but independent of the value jb . 
 
In a one-item second price auction, the value of the item (to a particular bidder) is a 
weakly dominant strategy. This value (cost in a reverse auction) is the bid that 
maximizes the bidder’s expected  profit (Vickrey, 1961). Applying this logic to a 
reverse auction in the price DVRCE setting, the cost of the contract is a weakly 
dominant strategy.  This cost is the price that maximizes the carrier’s expected profit. 
Therefore, the price for Ns  that maximizes the carrier’s expected profit is
* ( )N Nb c s= . 
Note that at time Nt  the effect of previous actions 1 1{ ,..., }Nb b −  is summarized in the 
state variable 0Nz , i.e. the cost of previous actions in the time interval 1{ ,..., }Nt t   is 
already a “sunk” cost and should not be considered again at time Nt . 
 
The carrier pricing the contract 1Ns −  is not in a situation strategically similar to a one-
item second price auction because the submitted price 1Nb −  has an impact on the future 
status of the carrier at time Nt  and therefore may affect the profit obtained for 
contract Ns . After submitting 1Nb −  there are only two possible outcomes: (1) the rights 
for contract 1Ns −  are acquired; or (2) the rights are lost.  If the former is true, the carrier’s 
status at time Nt  will be
1 1
1 1| a( , , )N N N N Nz z t h z− −= . If the latter is true, the carrier’s status 
at time Nt  will be
0 0
1 1| a( , , )N N N N Nz z t h z− −= . Defining 11( | )NN IN Ns z −−π as the expected profits 
from contract Ns  conditional on the previous outcome as: 
 
1 1
1 1 ( ) ( ) 1( | ) ( | 1) [ c( )| ) ]]NN NN N N N N N Ns z s I E E s z Iω ξ ξ− − −π π= = = [( −  
 
* *
1 11 | 1 0 | 1N N N N N NI if b I and I if b Iξ ξ− −= > = = < =  
 
or 
 
0 0
1 1 ( ) ( ) 1( | ) ( | 0) [ c( )| ) ]]NN NN N N N N N Ns z s I E E s z Iω ξ ξ− − −π π= = = [( −  
 
* *
1 11 | 0 0 | 0N N N N N NI if b I and I if b Iξ ξ− −= > = = < =  
 
 
 
Pricing in Dynamic Vehicle Routing Problems 
Figliozzi,  Mahmassani & Jaillet 
 
8 
If contract 1Ns −  is acquired, the carrier’s fleet will not necessarily travel a distance 
equivalent to the myopic incremental cost 1( )Nc s −  because the possible arrival and 
acquisition of contract Ns  may cut short the fleet’s deployment plan, implemented at 
time 1Nt − . The optimal price
*
1Nb −  that maximizes the carrier’s expected profits from 
time 1Nt −  onwards is: 
 
* 1 0
1 ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
arg max [ ( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) (1 ) ]
1 0R,
N NN N N N N N N N N
N N
b E c s I s z I s z I
b I if b and I if b
ξ ξ
ξ ξ
− − − − − − −
− −
π π∈ − + + −
∈ = > = <
 
 
Similarly, after submitting 2Nb −  there are only two possible outcomes: (1) the rights for 
contract 2Ns −  are acquired; or (2) the rights are lost. If the former is true, the carrier’s 
status at time 1Nt −  will be
1
1 2|N Nz z− − . If the latter is true, the carrier’s status at time 1Nt −  
will be 01 2|N Nz z− − . Defining 21 1 2( | )NN
I
N Ns z −− − −π as the expected profits from contract 1Ns −  
onwards conditional on the previous outcome as: 
 
11
1 1 1 0
1 2 ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 1 1 1( | ) [ ( )| ) ( | ) ( | ) (1 )]]NN N NN N N N N N N N N N Ns z E E c s z I s z I s z Iω ξ ξ−− − − − − − − − − −π π π= [( − + + −
 
* *
1 1 2 1 1 21 | 1 0 | 1N N N N N NI if b I and I if b Iξ ξ− − − − − −= > = = < =  
 
and 
 
11
0 0 1 1
1 2 ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 1 1 1( | ) [ ( )| ) ( | ) ( | ) (1 )]]NN N NN N N N N N N N N N Ns z E E c s z I s z I s z Iω ξ ξ−− − − − − − − − − −π π π= [( − + + −
 
* *
1 1 2 1 1 21 | 0 0 | 0N N N N N NI if b I and I if b Iξ ξ− − − − − −= > = = < =  
 
Note (again) that at time 1Nt −  the effect of previous actions 1 2{ ,..., }Nb b −  is summarized 
in the state variable 0 1Nz − , i.e. the cost of previous actions in the time interval 1 1{ ,..., }Nt t −   
is already a “sunk” cost and should not be considered again at time 1Nt − . The optimal 
price * 2Nb −  that maximizes the carrier’s expected profits from time 2Nt −  onwards is: 
 
1 1
* 1 0
2 ( ) 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
2 2
arg max [ ( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) (1 ) ]
1 0R,
N NN N N N N N N N N
N N
b E c s I s z I s z I
b I if b and I if b
ξ ξ
ξ ξ
− −− − − − − − − − −
− −
π π∈ − + + −
∈ = > = <
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Using induction, the optimal price *jb  that maximizes the carrier’s expected profits from 
time jt  onwards is: 
 
1 1
* 1 0
( ) 1 1arg max [ ( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) (1 ) ]j jj j j j j j j j jb E c s I s z I s z Iξ ξ + ++ +π π∈ − + + −  (1) 
1 0R, j jb I if b and I if bξ ξ∈ = > = <  
 
where, 1 1( | )jj
I
j js z+ +π  is defined as the expected profits from contract 1js +  onwards and 
conditional on the previous outcome as: 
 
11 2 2
1 1 1 0
1 ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1( | ) [ ( )| ) ( | ) ( | )(1 )]]jj j jj j j j j j j j j j js z E E c s z I s z I s z Iω ξ ξ++ + ++ + + + + + + + +π π π= [( − + + −  (2) 
 
* *
1 1 1 11 | 1 0 | 1j j j j j jI if b I and I if b Iξ ξ+ + + += > = = < =  
 
and 
 
11 2 2
0 0 1 0
1 ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1( | ) [ ( )| ) ( | ) ( | )(1 )]]jj j jj j j j j j j j j j js z E E c s z I s z I s z Iω ξ ξ++ + ++ + + + + + + + +π π π= [( − + + −
 (3) 
* *
1 1 1 11 | 0 0 | 0j j j j j jI if b I and I if b Iξ ξ+ + + += > = = < =  
 
4.1  Solving for the optimal price DVRCE 
 
Neither equation (2) nor equation (3) are affected by the bid value for shipment js ; they 
are simply conditioned on the outcome of the tender for js . The expected value of the 
present plus future profits for any bid b R∈  can be expressed as: 
 
 
11 1
1 0
( ) 1[ ( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) (1 ) ]jj jj j j j j j jE c s I s z I s z Iξ ξ ++ ++π π− + + − =  (4) 
1 11 1
1 0( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
j jj j
b
j j j
b b
c s p d s z p d s z p dξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ+ ++ +
∞ ∞
−∞
π π= − + +∫ ∫ ∫  
 
The first two integrals are evaluated in the interval [b, ∞] because they equal zero as 
long as price b  is greater than the competitors’ prices ( )b ξ> , or equivalently, if the 
contract js  is won. The last integral is evaluated in the interval [-∞, b] because it is not 
zero only when the bid b  is bigger than the competitors’ bids ( )b ξ> , or equivalently, if 
the contract js  is lost
4. Grouping terms in (4): 
                                                 
4 Appendix 1 considers the case where ( )p b ξ=  is not negligible (e.g. the price function is a probability mass 
function). The derivation is somewhat different but the optimal price has the same expression in both cases. 
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1 1 11 1 1
1 0 0( ( ) ( | ) ( | ) ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
j j jj j jj j j j
b
c s s z s z p d s z p dξ ξ ξ ξ ξ+ + ++ + +
∞ ∞
−∞
π π π− + − +∫ ∫  
1 11 1
1 0( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
j jj j
b
j j j
b b
c s p d s z p d s z p dξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ+ ++ +
∞ ∞
−∞
π π= − + +∫ ∫ ∫  (5) 
 
The term 
 
1 11 1
1 0( ) ( | ) ( | )
j jj jj j j
c s s z s z+ ++ +π π− + −  
 
does not depend on the realization of ξ  or the value of b .  
 
Denoting 
1 11 1
* 1 0( ) ( | ) ( | )
j jj jj j j j
c c s s z s z+ ++ +π π= − +  and replacing in (4): 
 
1 11 1 1
1 0 0 *
( ) 1[( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) ] ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( )j jj j jj j j j j j
b
E c s s z s z s z c p dξ ξ ξ ξ ξ+ ++ + +
∞
+π π π− + + = + −∫  (6) 
 
Equation (6) is strategically equivalent to a second price auction, where ξ   represents 
the distribution of the best competitors’ prices and *jc  is the carrier’s cost. The price that 
maximizes equation (6) is simply *jc ; the proof that
*
jc  is optimal parallels the proof for 
the one-item second price auction. Assuming *jb c>  then: 
 
* *
* * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j j
b
j j j j
b b c c
c p d c p d c p d c p dξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
∞ ∞ ∞
− ≤ − + − = −∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
since all the elements in the last integral are equal or larger than zero. Assuming *jb c<  
then: 
*
* *
* * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j
j j
c
j j j j
b bc c
c p d c p d c p d c p dξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
∞ ∞ ∞
− ≥ − + − = −∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
since in the last integral the term *jcξ −  is negative while the other multiplicands are 
equal or bigger than zero. Therefore, equation (6) is maximized when *jb c= . Therefore, 
the optimal bid for a shipment js  is:  
 
1 1
* 1 0
1 1( ) ( | ) ( | )j jj j j j j jc c s s z s z+ ++ +π π= − +  (7) 
 
In a one-item second price auction, the optimal bid is equivalent to the value of the item, 
at a price such that the bidder is indifferent between accepting or rejecting the item. 
Applying the same logic, a carrier’s cost of serving a contract is equal to the price that 
maximizes the carrier’s profit – in the assumed marketplace and given a carrier’s 
assignment function and status – the value is provided by equation (7). Equations (2) 
and (3) show the recursive and exponential nature of the problem. The assignment 
function 1a( , , )t t jz t h z −=  is the “rule” used to obtain a carrier’s status when a new 
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shipment arrives or a projection of a schedule into the future. The cost provided by 
c( )js  is the incremental cost for incorporating js  to the carrier schedule. Equation (7) 
represents the value of the best price for a contract given a carrier’s assignment 
technology “ a ”. Therefore, a carrier with a different fleet assignment method may have 
a different value for the optimal bid (even if both carriers have the same fleet status). 
The intuition behind (7) is straightforward. The first term represents the “incremental 
cost” of serving contract js . The other two terms are linked to the future and are best 
interpreted together as the change in future profits or opportunity costs brought about by 
serving contract js . This is illustrated in a simple example in the next section.  
 
5.  VRPCE Example 
 
This section illustrates how the concepts and formulas derived in Section 3 apply to a 
simple yet instructive example. Consider a single truck that serves a square 
region ABCD . Only two types of contracts are possible: carrying a load from A to B 
(contract AB ) or from D to A (contract DA ) as illustrated in figure 1. A contract arrives 
at each unit of time; there are no uncertainties about the arrival times, only about the 
contract characteristics, { , }AB DAΩ =  and ( ) ( ) 0.5p AB p DA= = . The distances are 
Manhattan (metric 1) and there are no repositioning costs associated with the final 
location of the truck. Each contract must be fully served within 3 units of time following 
its arrival (time window). The truck travels with a unit speed, therefore in a unit of time 
the truck covers a distance equivalent to a side of the square. There is a probability mass 
function for the “competition prices”: ( 1) 1/ 4p ξ = = , ( 2) 1/ 2p ξ = = , and 
( 3) 1/ 4p ξ = = . The carrier assignment function is such that the truck travels the 
shortest path necessary to serve all outstanding (not fully served yet) contracts. The 
execution of a shortest path (deployment plan) can only be interrupted or modified by 
the acquisition of future contracts.  
 
To illustrate the concepts and formulas, let us initially assume that the truck is located at 
vertex A at time Nt  and has no outstanding (remaining) contracts to serve. If contract AB 
arrives at time Nt  and the carrier status is { }Nz A= , the price is simply the full 
incremental cost ( ) 1N Nb s AB= = ; for contract DA and { }Nz A=  the price is 
simply ( ) 2N Nb s DA= = . 
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Figure 1:  Example: square service region, 2 types of contracts, and constant  
deterministic contract arrival rate 
 
 
Let’s now assume that the truck is located at vertex A at time 1Nt −  and has no 
outstanding (remaining) contracts to serve with corresponding 1 { }Nz A− = .  If contract 
AB arrives at time 1Nt −  and the carrier status is 1 { }Nz A− =  the price is: 
 
1 0
1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | )N NN N N N N N Nb s AB c s s z s z− − − − −π π= = − +  
 
The incremental cost is in this case is: 
 
1 ' 0 '
1 1 1 1 1( ) d(a , , ) d(a , , ) 1 0 1N N N N Nc s AB z t z t− − − − −= = − = − =  
 
The term 1 1( | )N N Ns z −π  is calculated taking into account that 1 1 { , }Nz A AB− =  and the 
future status is going to be { }Nz B= , then c( ) |( { }) 2N Ns AB z B= = =  
and c( ) |( { }) 3N Ns DA z B= = = . For the case where c( ) |( { }) 2N N Ns AB z B b= = = =  the 
expected profit at time Nt  is calculated as: 
A D 
B C 
t1 t2 t3 tN-2 tN-1 tN 
1 1 1 1 
s1 s2 s3 sN-2 sN-1 sN 
Lengths  
|AB|= |BC|= |CD|= |DA|= 1 
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( ) ( )c( ) | ( { }) ) ] | ( { })) ] (3 2)1/ 4 1/ 4N N N N N NE s AB z B I E b z B Iξ ξξ ξ[( − = = = [( − = = − = .  
 
Only one term is needed because the arrival of contract Ns  will not produce any profits 
for price realizations 2 c( ) | ( { })N N Nb s AB z Bξ ≤ = = = = . For the case where 
c( ) |( { }) 3N N Ns DA z B b= = = =  the expected profit at time Nt  is simply zero since all 
possible prices are less or equal than three. The term 1 1( | )N N Ns z −π  then is estimated as: 
 
1 1
1 ( ) ( ) 1( | ) [ c( )| ) ]] (1/ 2) (1/ 4) 1/ 8NN N N N N Ns z E E s z Iω ξ ξ− −π = [( − = =  
 
The term 0 1( | )N N Ns z −π  is calculated taking into account that 0 1 { }Nz A− =  and the future 
status is going to be { }Nz A= ;  
 
then c( | { }) 1N N Ns AB z A b= = = =  and c( | { }) 2N N Ns DA z A b= = = = .  
 
For the former cost the expected profit is: 
 
( ) c( | { })) ] (3 1)1/ 4 (2 1)1/ 2 1N N NE s AB z A Iξ ξ[( − = = = − + − = .  
 
For the latter cost the expected profit is:  
 
( ) c( | { })) ] (3 2)1/ 4 1/ 4N N NE s DA z A Iξ ξ[( − = = = − =  
 
The term 0 1( | )N N Ns z −π  is estimated as: 
 
1 0
1 ( ) ( ) 1( | ) [ c( )| ) ]] (1/ 2) 1 (1/ 2) (1/ 4) 5 / 8NN N N N N Ns z E E s z Iω ξ ξ− −π = [( − = + =  
 
The optimal price for 1Ns AB− =  with 1 { }Nz A− =  is calculated as: 
 
1 0
1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | ) 1 1/ 8 5 / 8 3/ 2N NN N N N N N Nb s AB c s s z s z− − − − −π π= = − + = − + =  
 
Assume that the truck is located at vertex A at time 1Nt −  with 1 { }Nz A− = .  If contract DA 
has arrived at time 1Nt −  and the carrier status is 1 { }Nz A− =  the price is: 
 
1 0
1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | )N NN N N N N N Nb s DA c s s z s z− − − − −π π= = − +  
 
The incremental cost in this case is obtained using: 
 
1 ' 0 '
1 1 1 1 1 1( | { }) d(a , , ) d(a , , ) 2 0 2N N N N N Nc s DA z A z t z t− − − − − −= = = − = − =  
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The term 1 1( | )N N Ns z −π  is calculated taking into account that 1 1 { ; }Nz A DA− =  and the 
future status is going to be { ; }Nz D DA= . In the case where there is an outstanding 
contract, the incremental cost of serving a just arrived contract Ns  up to time Nt t≥   is 
estimated using:  
 
1 ' 0 '( , ) d(a , , ) d(a , , )N N N N Nc s t z t z t= − , 
 
but the second term is not zero. In particular, for c( | { ; })N Ns AB z D DA= =  
and c( | { ; })N Ns DA z D DA= =  the incremental costs for the last arriving contract are 
calculated as follows: 
 
1 ' 0 '( | { , }) d(a , , ) d(a , , ) 2 1 1N N N N N Nc s AB z D DA z t z t= = = − = − =  
 
1 ' 0 '( | { , }) d(a , , ) d(a , , ) 1 1 0N N N N N Nc s DA z D DA z t z t= = = − = − =  
 
In the last expression it is implicitly assumed that the truck capacity is sufficient to carry 
two contract cargos simultaneously. The future expected profits are: 
 
( ) c( | { ; })) ] (3 1)1/ 4 (2 1)1/ 2 1N N NE s AB z D DA Iξ ξ[( − = = = − + − =  
 
( ) c( | { ; })) ] (3 0)1/ 4 (2 0)1/ 2 (1 0)(1/ 4) 2N N NE s DA z D DA Iξ ξ[( − = = = − + − + − =   
 
The term 1 1( | )N N Ns z −π  is estimated as: 
 
1 1
1 ( ) ( ) 1( | ) [ c( )| ) ]] (1/ 2) 1 (1/ 2) 2 3/ 2NN N N N N Ns z E E s z Iω ξ ξ− −π = [( − = + =  
 
The term 0 1( | )N N Ns z −π  is calculated taking into account that 0 1 { }Nz A− =  and the future 
status is going to be { }Nz A= , then c( | { }) 1N Ns AB z A= = =  
and c( | { }) 2N Ns DA z A= = = . For the former cost the expected profit is: 
 
( ) c( )) ] (3 1)1/ 4 (2 1)1/ 2 1N NE s AB Iξ ξ[( − = = − + − = .  
 
For the latter cost the expected profit is:  
 
( ) c( )) ] (3 2)1/ 4 1/ 4N NE s DA Iξ ξ[( − = = − =  
 
The term 0 1( | )N N Ns z −π  then is estimated as: 
 
1 0
1 ( ) ( ) 1( | ) [ c( )| ) ]] (1/ 2) 1 (1/ 2) (1/ 4) 5 / 8NN N N N N Ns z E E s z Iω ξ ξ− −π = [( − = + =  
 
Then, the optimal price for 1Ns AB− =  with 1 { }Nz A− =  is calculated as: 
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1 0
1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | ) 2 3/ 2 5 / 8 9 / 8N NN N N N N N Nb s AB c s s z s z− − − − −π π= = − + = − + =  
 
This simple example illustrates the importance of properly estimating contract costs in a 
VRPCE environment. Obviously, contract AB deploys the truck in an unfavorable 
position while contract DA deploys the truck in a highly favorable position. This is 
reflected in the prices starting from point A and with no outstanding contracts:  
( ) 1N Nb s AB= =  and 1 1( ) 3 / 2N Nb s AB− − = =  (price goes up); ( ) 2N Nb s DA= =  and 
1 1( ) 9 / 8N Nb s DA− − = =  (price goes down). Not only is the price change sign different 
but also the magnitude of the change is such that there is an order reversal if contracts 
are sorted (ascending or descending price order) at times 1Nt −  and Nt .   
 
This example also shows the importance of opportunity costs. There are two elements 
that could increase the appeal of serving contract DA over contract AB: 1) better 
deployment that reduces future incremental costs, and 2) the fact that two contracts can 
be served simultaneously.  Note that in all cases the location of the truck was assumed 
at the same vertex A initially. Appendix 3 shows the application of first price auction 
payment rules to the same example; the results are remarkably different as illustrated in 
the next section and appendix 3.  
 
6.  Other Payment Mechanisms 
 
Altering the payment rules can significantly simplify or complicate the pricing problem. 
The former situation occurs if the reward for contract js  becomes known at the time of 
arrival; the latter situation occurs if the reward is a function of the submitted price. 
These two situations are described next. 
 
6.1  Acceptance/Rejection Problems  
 
If the reward for contract js  becomes known at the time of arrival, then the VRPCE 
problem becomes a dynamic acceptance/rejection problem. Let denote jξ  as the reward 
for contract js . Equation (1) can be transformed into an acceptance/rejection threshold 
because there are two possible outcomes: a) a bid over the reward jξ  that implies a 
rejection, and b) a bid below the reward jξ  that implies an acceptance. It must be 
remembered that in a second price auction, a carrier’s reward is the 2nd best bid if the 
auction is won; the acceptance/rejection problem is equivalent to having a carrier that 
knows all competitors’ bids and therefore knows in advance the second lowest bid 
which is jξ . Then equation (1)  
 
1 1
* 1 0
( ) 1 1arg max [ ( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) (1 ) ]j jj j j j j j j j jb E c s I s z I s z Iξ ξ + ++ +π π∈ − + + −  
1 0R, j jb I if b and I if bξ ξ∈ = > = <  
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can be transformed into equation (8), the acceptance rejection case: 
 
1 1
* 1 0
1 1arg max [ ( ( ) ( | )) , ( | ) (1 ) ]j jj j j j j j j j jb c s s z I s z Iξ + ++ +π∈ − + π −  (8) 
1 0R, j j j jb I if b and I if bξ ξ∈ = > = <  
If the bid submitted is j bξ >  future profits are 1 11( ) ( | )jj j j jc s s zξ + +π− + , otherwise 
if j bξ <  future profits are 1 01( | )j j js z+ +π . Combining these profits, the acceptance rule is: 
 
1 1
0 1( ) ( | ) ( | )j jj j j j j jc s s z s zξ + +π≥ + −π  (9) 
 
Note that if there is a penalty for rejecting a contract denoted as jp , then the acceptance 
rule becomes: 
 
1 1
0 1
1 1( ) ( | ) ( | )j jj j j j j j jc s s z s z pξ + ++ +π≥ + −π −  (10) 
 
A dynamic acceptance/rejection problem in LTL5 transportation is studied by Kleywegt 
and Papastavrou (1998), whose work deals with the distribution problem between LTL 
terminals where customers request a batch of loads between different origins and 
destinations. The dispatcher must dynamically accept/reject shipments and decide on 
truck origin/destination movements, number of trucks dispatched, and truck/loads 
assignments. The model considers a reward for served shipments, a constant penalty for 
rejected shipments, holding costs for vehicles and loads at terminals, and transportation 
costs between terminals. The problem is solved using a continuous time Markov 
decision process. Conceptually, Kleywegt and Papastavrou’s (1998) work is the closest 
to an acceptance/rejection VRPCE because request characteristics and rewards come 
from a known probability distribution and become known at the time of the request's 
arrival. However, the underlying problem is not a VRP but a dynamic assignment-
dispatching problem between a fixed set of origin destination pairs.  Equation (10) is 
equivalent to the optimal acceptance rule derived by Kleywegt and Papastavrou (1998) 
for the dynamic dispatching policies in a LTL problem.  
 
6.2  First Price Auction Payments 
 
If the reward obtained for acquiring the right to serve a contract is the price submitted 
itself (reward jb  if contract js  is won), the carrier pricing problem in the last contract 
Ns  is no longer in a situation strategically similar to a one-item second price auction. 
The superscript “1” will be used to denote prices and expectation that only apply to the 
first price auction payment format. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 LTL = less than truck load  
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The bid that maximizes the bidder’s expected profit for the last contract is: 
 
1*
( )
1
arg max [ ( ( )) ]
1 0R,
N N N
N N
b E b c s I
b I if b and I if b
ξ
ξ ξ−
∈ −
∈ = > = <
 
 
The bid that maximizes the bidder’s expected profit for contract 1Ns −  is: 
 
1* 1 0
1 ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
arg max [ ( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) (1 ) ]
1 0R,
N NN N N N N N N N N
N N
b E b c s I s z I s z I
b I if b and I if b
ξ
ξ ξ
− − − − − − −
− −
π π∈ − + + −
∈ = > = <
 
 
The bid that maximizes the bidder’s expected profit for contract js  is: 
 
1* 1 0
1 ( ) 1 1 1arg max [ ( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) (1 ) ]N NN j j j j N j j jb E b c s I s z I s z Iξ− + − +π π∈ − + + −  (11) 
 
1 0R, j jb I if b and I if bξ ξ∈ = > = <  
 
The future expected profits are calculated as follows: 
 
1
1 1 1
1 2 2
* 1 0
1 ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1( | ) [ ( ) | ) ( | ) ( | )(1 )]]jj j j
I I
j j j j j j j j j j j js z E E b c s z I s z I s z Iω ξ++ + ++ + + + + + + + + +π π π= [( − + + −
 (12) 
 
Note that in general 1 1 11 1( | ) ( | )j j
I I
j j j js z s z+ ++ +π π≠ . In auction terminology, this type of 
payment or reward corresponds to a first price auction.  
 
In general, the price that maximizes expected profits is (derivation in Appendix 2): 
 
1* 1*arg max[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ]j j
b
b b c s p dξ ξ
∞
∈ −∫  (13) 
Rb∈  
 
where 
1 1
1 1
1 1
1* 1 0( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | )
j jj jj j j j
c s c s s z s z+ ++ +π π= + −  
 
Since the reward is no longer independent from the price submitted by the carrier, 
expression (13) is more involved that previously obtained expression (7). Furthermore, 
expression (13) indicates that the price submitted by the carrier is not necessarily the 
cost of servicing the arriving shipment ( 1*( )jc s ).  This type of pricing conceals the 
importance of repositioning costs and truck location/status as shown in Appendix 3; 
first price auction payments may lead to ex-ante inefficient outcomes. The same 
phenomena was observed by Figliozzi et al. (2005) when simulating first and second 
price auction marketplaces. After employing first price auction rules in the example 
previously studied in section 4, the prices submitted for contract AB 
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are: 1 1( ) ( )N N N Nb s AB b s AB− −= = = .  This example clearly shows that prices with first 
price auction payments do not necessarily reflect the cost of generating the transport 
service. For all of the above-mentioned reasons, a second price auction mechanism is 
employed to allocate contracts in a VRPCE. 
 
7.  VRPCE Implementation 
 
The numerical implementation of a VRPCE strategy may be a difficult task for large 
fleets or a large number of contracts. Even assuming for the time being that 
1,..., 1{ ,..., }j N j NS s s+ +=  is known at time jt , each of the remaining N-j contracts can be 
won or lost generating a decision tree that has 2N j−  end nodes and corresponding 
possible future trajectories. Furthermore, one needs to consider solving an NP-hard 
problem (underlying VRPs) every time ( )kc s  has to be estimated.  
 
A further source of difficulty is that the profitability of each path history up to a given 
time is dependent on the value of future costs (which are unknown when going 
forward). Conversely, the value of future costs are known when moving backwards, 
however one does not know the carrier’s status at the time (a carrier’s status is 
dependent on the previous path history). It is important to note that future fleet 
deployment depends on the present price tendered and its probability of winning. At the 
same time, the present price depends on the future profits and future fleet status. 
 
The exact or computational estimation of equation (7) may be quite involved or even 
intractable for small problems.  In this section, we propose and evaluate a 
computationally straightforward approximation of equation (7). This approach is 
denoted herein one-step-look-ahead (1SLA) since it limits the evaluation of the future 
profits to just one-step or period into the future: 
 
11
1 1
1 ( ) ( ) 1 1( | ) [ ( )| ) ]]jj j j j j js z E E c s z Iω ξ ξ++ + + +π ≈ [( −  
 
11
0 0
1 ( ) ( ) 1 1( | ) [ ( )| ) ]]jj j j j j js z E E c s z Iω ξ ξ++ + + +π ≈ [( −  
 
To estimate these two terms it is assumed that the 1SLA carrier knows the true 
distribution of load arrivals over time and their spatial distribution Ω  and also has an 
estimation of the endogenously generated prices or payments ξ ; in this paper this type 
of carrier estimates the price function as a normal function, whose mean and standard 
deviation are obtained from the whole sample of previous prices. The 1SLA approach 
uses this expression to estimate the price: 
 
1 1
1 0
( ) ( ) 1 1 ( ) ( ) 1 1( ) ( ) [ ( )| ) ]] [ ( )| ) ]]j jj j j j j j j jb s c s E E c s z I E E c s z Iω ξ ω ξξ ξ+ ++ + + += − [( − + [( −  
 
The 1SLA carrier is compared against a static approach which does not take into 
account the stochastic nature of the problem. This is a natural benchmark since it 
represents a myopic carrier. This is herein denoted as the “static” approach where the 
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price submitted for a given shipment js  is simply ( )jc s . The mixed integer program 
formulation used to estimate ( )jc s  is based on the formulation proposed by Yang et al. 
(2004).  
 
Simulations are used to simultaneously compare how the 1SLA and static 
approximations perform under different market settings (in our case limited to arrival 
rates and time windows). Market and simulation settings used to quantify and compare 
the performance of the two approaches are described next.  
 
7.1  Market and Simulation Settings 
 
The simulated market enables the sale of truckload cargo capacity based mainly on 
price, yet still satisfies customer level of service demands (in this case hard time 
windows or TW). Shipments and vehicles are fully compatible in all cases; there are no 
special shipments or commodity specific equipment. Three different TW 
length/shipment service duration ratios are simulated. These ratios are denoted short, 
medium, and long; a reference to the average time window length. The different Time 
Window Lengths (TWL) for a shipment js , where ( )jld s  denotes the function that 
returns the distance between a shipment origin and destination, are: 
 
• TWL( ) 1( ( ) 0.25) uniform[0.0,1.0] ( )j js ld s short= + +  
• TWL( ) 2( ( ) 0.25) uniform[0.0,2.0] ( )j js ld s medium= + +  
• TWL( ) 3( ( ) 0.25) uniform[0.0,3.0] ( )j js ld s long= + +  
 
The shipments to be auctioned are circumscribed in a bounded geographical region. The 
simulated region is a 1 by 1 square area. Trucks travel from shipment origins to 
destinations at a constant unit speed (1 unit distance per unit time). Shipment origins 
and destinations are uniformly distributed over the region. There is no explicit 
underlying network structure in the chosen origin-destination demand pattern. 
Alternatively, it can be seen as a network with infinite number of origins and 
destinations (essentially each point in the set [0,1]x[0,1]) has an infinite number of 
corresponding links. Each and every link possesses an equal infinitesimal probability of 
occurrence.). Vehicles are assumed to travel at a constant speed in a Euclidean two 
dimensional space. Vehicles speeds are a unit; the average shipment length is ≅0.52. 
Carriers’ sole sources of revenue are the payments received when a shipment is 
acquired. Shippers’ reservation price is set as 1.41 units (diagonal of the square area) 
plus the loaded distance of the shipment. Carriers’ costs are proportional to the total 
distance traveled by the fleet. It is assumed that all carriers have the same unit cost per 
mile.  
 
The market is comprised of shippers that independently call for shipment procurement 
auctions and two carriers. Different demand/supply ratios are studied. Arrival rates 
range from low to high. At a low arrival rate, all the shipments can be served (if some 
shipments are not serviced it is due to a very short time window). At a high arrival rate 
carriers operate at capacity and many shipments have to be rejected.  The expected 
inter-arrival time is normalized with respect to the market fleet size. The expected inter-
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arrival times are 1/ 2   arrivals per unit time per truck, 2 / 2  arrivals per unit time per 
truck, and 3/ 2  arrivals per unit time per truck (low, medium, and high arrival rates 
respectively). The results obtained reflect the steady state operation (1000 arrivals and 
10 iterations) of the simulated system.  
 
Allocations follow the rules of a second price reverse auction. It is important to 
highlight that carriers are competing for each shipment or contract. Carriers are 
simultaneously interacting in the same market, which better resembles the operation of a 
dynamic competitive market rather than the evaluation of each strategy separately (with 
no interaction) followed by a comparison of the separately obtained results. Simulation 
results that asses the quality of the 1SLA approximation in relation to the static 
approximation are presented next.  
 
7.2  Analysis of Results 
 
Tables 1 to 3 compare the results for the 1SLA carrier vs. the static carrier. Table 1 
illustrates that the 1SLA carrier outperforms profit-wise its competitor or obtains a 
higher market share when profit differences are not statistically significant.  
 
Table 2 presents the average fleet utilization per carrier (fleet utilization reflects on 
average what percentage of the time trucks are not idle), which as expected increases 
when the number of shipments served (table 1) or arrival rate increases. The average 
loaded distance per carrier shows a distinct pattern; the 1SLA carrier tends to serve 
shorter shipments when there is a short time window. This is an intuitive result, as 
shorter shipments tend to utilize fewer resources. 
 
Arrival 
Rate TW 
Carrier 
Type 
Average 
Profit 
St. Dev. 
Profit 
% Diff. 
Profit 
Average 
Served 
St. Dev. 
Served 
% Diff. 
Served 
1SLA 103.44 1.81 210.50 1.52 Short 
Static 99.49 3.11 
4.0% 
212.50 2.22 
-0.9% 
1SLA 63.85 1.62 288.30 3.64 Med. 
Static 46.59 1.43 
37.0% 
210.90 3.63 
36.7% 
1SLA 63.44 1.96 306.70 4.28 
LOW 
Long 
Static 35.29 0.99 
79.8% 
193.30 4.28 
58.7% 
1SLA 242.59 3.19 366.80 3.92 Short 
Static 215.60 3.52 
12.5% 
394.40 2.55 
-7.0% 
1SLA 162.57 3.84 515.60 2.37 Med. 
Static 163.32 3.35 
-0.5% 
459.60 2.57 
12.2% 
1SLA 144.32 3.09 576.20 4.35 
MED. 
Long 
Static 120.49 2.53 
19.8% 
420.80 4.79 
36.9% 
1SLA 387.59 4.63 475.50 5.27 Short 
Static 331.58 3.99 
16.9% 
513.30 2.52 
-7.4% 
1SLA 337.55 5.56 605.40 5.12 Med. 
Static 306.70 3.00 
10.1% 
598.80 4.47 
1.1% 
1SLA 315.04 6.07 651.30 7.40 
HIGH 
Long 
Static 314.80 4.09 
0.1% 
635.40 5.74 
2.5% 
 
Table 1 
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Table 3 shows how the 1SLA carrier modifies the static service cost per arriving 
shipment. The static insertion cost is equal to ( )jc s  minus shipment js  loaded distance 
(loaded distance associated costs are equal for all carriers). With shorter time windows 
prices are increased to reflect that is harder to serve additional shipments when time 
windows are tight; the static approach tends to undervalue the “true” cost of serving 
shipments when time windows are short. For larger time windows (low and medium 
arrival rates) prices are decreased; the static approach tends to overvalue the “true” cost 
of serving shipments when time windows are short However, if the fleet utilization is 
too high (over 90% as shown in table 2), the static approach tends to undervalue the 
“true” cost of serving shipments even when time windows are long.  
 
Arrival 
Rate TW 
Carrier 
Type 
Fleet 
Utilizat. 
St. Dev. 
Fleet 
Utilizat. 
% Diff. 
Utilizat. 
Average 
Loaded 
Dist. 
St. Dev. 
Loaded 
Dist. 
% Diff. 
Loaded 
Dist. 
1SLA 32.60% 0.0013 0.5083 0.0045 Short 
Static 33.97% 0.0027 
-4.0% 
0.5343 0.0079 
-4.9% 
1SLA 47.07% 0.0040 0.5265 0.0049 Med. 
Static 32.98% 0.0025 
42.7% 
0.5230 0.0078 
0.7% 
1SLA 48.85% 0.0034 0.5261 0.0050 
LOW 
Long 
Static 29.80% 0.0031 
63.9% 
0.5219 0.0056 
0.8% 
1SLA 57.68% 0.0019 0.5089 0.0073 Short 
Static 62.06% 0.0035 
-7.1% 
0.5263 0.0050 
-3.3% 
1SLA 80.71% 0.0036 0.5237 0.0077 Med. 
Static 71.58% 0.0042 
12.8% 
0.5274 0.0041 
-0.7% 
1SLA 86.99% 0.0049 0.5246 0.0068 
MED. 
Long 
Static 61.62% 0.0057 
41.2% 
0.5244 0.0063 
0.0% 
1SLA 74.38% 0.0026 0.5087 0.0097 Short 
Static 80.96% 0.0029 
-8.1% 
0.5326 0.0060 
-4.5% 
1SLA 95.43% 0.0009 0.5250 0.0050 Med. 
Static 93.83% 0.0024 
1.7% 
0.5285 0.0066 
-0.7% 
1SLA 97.21% 0.0013 0.5269 0.0064 
HIGH 
Long 
Static 92.64% 0.0031 
4.9% 
0.5244 0.0048 
0.5% 
 
Table 2 
 
There are two distinct forces operating on the market prices: time window lengths and 
arrival rates; the 1SLA strategy manages to outperform the static pricing approach either 
profit-wise or with a higher market shares when profits are not significantly different. In 
addition, the 1SLA strategy seems able to price discriminately by shipment 
characteristics (e.g. by the shipment loaded distance). 
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Arrival 
Rate TW 
Carrier 
Type 
Average 
Static 
Insertion 
Cost 
Average 
1
1
1( | )j j js z+ +π  
(1) 
Average 
1
0
1( | )j j js z+ +π  
(2) 
Diff.  
(2) –(1) 
(2) –(1)  
as % of 
Insertion 
Cost 
Short 1SLA 0.369 0.338 0.355 0.017 4.74% 
Med. 1SLA 0.405 0.181 0.143 -0.038 -9.39% LOW 
Long 1SLA 0.386 0.194 0.144 -0.050 -12.83% 
Short 1SLA 0.378 0.375 0.451 0.076 20.15% 
Med. 1SLA 0.397 0.219 0.197 -0.022 -5.52% MED. 
Long 1SLA 0.353 0.188 0.161 -0.027 -7.78% 
Short 1SLA 0.369 0.376 0.515 0.139 37.62% 
Med. 1SLA 0.391 0.332 0.353 0.021 5.32% HIGH 
Long 1SLA 0.348 0.260 0.271 0.011 3.28% 
 
Table 3 
 
8.  Informational and Behavioral Assumptions in the 
VRPCE problem 
 
The formulation presented in Section 3 is general enough to readily accommodate 
variants to the VRPCE whereas the solution procedures of sections three and four still 
apply. In a real life application, the arrival rates of contracts (Ω ) and price distributions 
(ξ ) need to be estimated. In such cases, when carriers must work with the estimated 
distributions, ( 0 1 1ˆ f( , ,..., )jy y y −Ω = ) and ( 0 1 1ˆ g( , ,..., )jy y yξ −= ), the amount of 
information revealed can have a high impact on the quality of the estimated 
distributions. Following the classification used by Figliozzi et al. (2003a) the two 
extremes of the information spectrum can be denoted as: (a) a maximum information 
environment (MaIE) where all arrivals and prices are revealed or (b) a minimum 
information environment (MiIE) where acceptance or rejection is the only information 
provided. These two extreme scenarios approximate two realistic situations. Maximum 
information would correspond to a totally transparent internet auction where all 
arrival/auction information is accessed by participants. Minimum information would 
correspond to a shipper selectively telephoning carriers for a quote, with the shipper 
only calling back the carrier that was selected. 
 
Some key assumptions are made in the VRPCE in order to keep the problem not only 
relevant from the economic and routing point of view but also tractable and 
conceptually well defined. The assumed price clearance rules (similar to 2nd price 
auctions) and independence (the “independence assumption” herein) between carrier 
actions and prices (or contract arrivals) assures that a rational carrier (with adequate 
computational capabilities) will only price his services at the incremental cost provided 
by equation (7). This fact is relevant since it takes away any strategic element from the 
DVRCE and focuses the attention on efficient routing and costing. Computational 
results have also shown that the second price with information about market clearing 
prices generates more wealth than first price auction clearing rules or second price 
auctions with minimum information (MiIE) (Figliozzi et al., 2005).  
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However, the “independence assumption” is a strong assumption especially in the full 
information case (MaIE).  With full information numerous data can be collected by the 
carriers and there may exist an incentive to use the revealed data to model how 
competitors price contracts. If this takes place, a carrier may model competitors’ 
behavior and add causal links between a carrier’s actions and future prices(Figliozzi, 
2004).  The “independence assumption” is more suitable when there is a large number 
of competitors, no participation fees or rejection penalties, information about market 
clearing prices, and unconstrained capacity as the game theoretical auction and 
industrial organization literature indicates (Krishna, 2002, Tirole, 1989). Therefore the 
“independence assumption” is more suitable in a truly competitive environment, hence 
the “CE” in VRPCE.   
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
This paper presents the VRPCE, illustrated as a dynamic extension of traveling 
salesmen problem with profits. In the VRPCE a carrier that attempts to act rationally 
must estimate the incremental cost of servicing the new service requests as they arrive 
dynamically.  An intuitive optimal price expression for the price DVRCE problem 
reveals that full incremental costs include: (a) the expected change due to altering the 
current fleet assignment scheme, and (b) the opportunity costs on future profits created 
by serving a new contract. A simple example showed that carriers’ prices under first 
price auction payment rules do not necessarily reflect the cost of servicing 
transportation requests.  
 
The proposed DVRCE problem provides an adequate framework to evaluate the impact 
of new service arrivals or changes in the fleet/shipments status in a competitive 
environment. Competition may involve either (a) two or more competing (opposing) 
options such as accept/reject, use private flee/use common carrier, charge price 
A/charge price B, etc or (b) a price competition with a rival company. Pricing is 
explicitly incorporated in the formulation; this is achieved by relaxing a sequential 
auctions mechanism to model a competitive environment that makes explicit carriers’ 
behavioral assumptions in the DVRCE problem. A simulation based approach to 
evaluate service costs was proposed and evaluated, the proposed approach not only 
outperforms a static pricing but it also intuitively  price discriminates by market arrival 
rate, time windows, and shipment characteristics.   
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Appendix 1 
 
If the value ( )p b ξ= is not negligible and for a given constant k , such that 0 1k≤ ≤ , 
let ( )k p b ξ=  represent the probability of acquiring the contract when there is a price 
tie. For a 0ε >  arbitrarily small, the expected value of the present plus future profits for 
any bid b R∈  can be expressed as: 
 
11 1
1 0
( ) 1[ ( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) (1 ) ]jj jj j j j j j jE c s I s z I s z Iξ ξ ++ ++π π− + + − =  (14) 
 
1 11 1
1 0( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
j jj j
b
j j j
b b
c s p d s z p d s z p d
ε
ε ε
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ+ ++ +
∞ ∞ −
+ + −∞
π π= − + +∫ ∫ ∫  
 
1 11 1
1 0( )*( ( )) ( )*( ( | ) ( | ) )
j jj jj j j
kp b b c s kp b s z s zξ ξ + ++ +π π+ = − + = +  
 
The first two integrals are evaluated in the interval [ , ]b ε+ ∞  because they equal zero as 
long as price b  is greater than the competitors’ prices ( )b ξ> , or equivalently, if the 
contract js  is won. The last integral is evaluated in the interval [ , ]b ε−∞ −  because it is 
not zero only when the bid b  is bigger than the competitors’ bids ( )b ξ> , or 
equivalently, if the contract js  is lost. Grouping terms in (14): 
 
1 1
1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1 0
0 1 0
( ( ) ( | ) ( | ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )*( ( ))
( | ) ( ) ( ) ( )*( ( | ) ) ( )*( ( | ) )
j j
j j j
j j
j j j
j j j j
b
j j j
c s s z s z p d kp b b c s
s z p d kp b s z kp b s z
ε
ξ ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
∞
+
∞
−∞
π π
π π π
− + − + = −
+ + = − =
∫
∫
 
 Regrouping once more: 
1 11 1
1 0( ( ) ( | ) ( | ) ) ( ) ( )
j jj jj j j
b
c s s z s z p d
ε
ξ ξ ξ+ ++ +
∞
+
π π− + −∫  (15) 
 
1 1 11 1 1
1 0 0( )*[ ( ) ( | ) ( | ) ] ( | )
j j jj j jj j j j
kp b c s s z s z s zξ ξ + + ++ + +π π π+ = − + − +  
 
Again, the term 
1 11 1
1 0( ) ( | ) ( | )
j jj jj j j
c s s z s z+ ++ +π π− + − does not depend on the realization 
of ξ  or the value of b . Denoting 
1 11 1
* 1 0( ) ( | ) ( | )
j jj jj j j j
c c s s z s z+ ++ +π π= − +  and 
replacing in (15): 
 
11
* * 0( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )*[ ( ) ] ( | )
jjj j j j j
b
c s p d kp b c s s z
ε
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ++
∞
+
π− + = − +∫  (16) 
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Equation (16) is strategically equivalent to a second price auction, where ξ   represents 
the distribution of the best competitors’ prices and *jc  is the carrier’s cost. The price that 
maximizes equation (16) is simply *jc , the proof that
*
jc  is optimal parallels the proof for 
the one-item second price auction. The term 
11
0( | )
jj j
s z++π  is constant and be taken out 
without altering the comparisons.  
 
Assuming *jb c>  then: 
 
*
* *
* * *
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*[ ( ) ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ) ( )
j
j j j
b
b
j j j j
b c
c p d kp b c s
c p d p b c s c p d
ε
ε
ε
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
∞
+
∞ −
+
− + = − ≤
≤ − + = − + −
∫
∫ ∫
 
 
since all the elements in the last integral are equal or larger than zero and 
( ) ( )p b kp bξ ξ= ≥ =  is also larger than zero.  
 
Assuming *jb c<  then: 
 
*
* *
* * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*[ ( )]
j
j j
c
j j j j j
bc c
c p d c p d c p d kp b c s
ε
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
∞ ∞
+
− ≥ − + − + = −∫ ∫ ∫
 
since in the last integral the term *jcξ −  is negative and in the last term 
*( )*[ ( )]j jkp b b c sξ = −  is negative. while Therefore, equation (16) is maximized 
when *jb c= . Therefore, the optimal bid for a shipment js  is equal to (7):  
1 1
* 1 0( ) ( | ) ( | )j jj j j j j jc c s s z s z+ +π π= − +  
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Appendix 2 
 
For the first price auction payment, the optimal price must maximize expected profits. 
The expected value of the present plus future profits for any bid b R∈  can be expressed 
as: 
 
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
( ) 1
1 0
[ ( ( )) ( | ) ( | ) (1 ) ]
( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
j
j j
j j
j j
j j j j j j j
b
j j j
b b
E b c s I s z I s z I
b c s p d s z p d s z p d
ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
+
+ +
+ +
+ +
+
∞ ∞
−∞
π π
π π
− + + − =
= − + +∫ ∫ ∫
 
 
The first two integrals are evaluated in the interval [b, ∞] because they equal zero as 
long as price b  is greater than the competitors’ prices ( )b ξ> , or equivalently, if the 
contract js  is won. The last integral is evaluated in the interval [-∞, b] because it is not 
zero only when the bid b  is bigger than the competitors’ bids ( )b ξ> , or equivalently, if 
the contract js  is lost. Grouping terms: 
 
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 0
( ( ) ( | ) ( | ) ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ( | ) ( | ) ) ( ) ( ) ( | )
j j j
j j j
j j j
j j j
j j j j
b
j j j j
b
b c s s z s z p d s z p d
b c s s z s z p d s z
ξ ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
∞ ∞
−∞
∞
π π π
π π π
− + − +
= − + − +
∫ ∫
∫
 
 
The last term is a constant. Replacing
1 1
1 1
1 1
1* 1 0( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | )
j jj jj j j j
c s c s s z s z+ ++ +π π= + − , the 
optimal bid maximizes: 
 
1* 1*arg max[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ]
R
j j
b
b b c s p d
b
ξ ξ
∞
∈ −
∈
∫  
 
There is no general expression for the optimal bid that is “distribution free” and 
equivalent to expression (7). For each particular distribution of prices there will be a 
corresponding optimal price function. For example, if prices are uniformly distributed in 
the interval [0, ]u , the optimal price is: 
 
1*
1* ( )
2
j
j
u c s
b
−=   for 1*0 ( )jc s u≤ ≤ , 1* 2j
ub =   for 1*( ) 0jc s < , and 1*jb u>   for 
1*( )jc s u>  
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Appendix 3 
 
This appendix applies first price auction payment mechanisms to the example presented 
in section 5.  To illustrate the concepts and formulas let’s initially assume that the truck 
is originally located at vertex A. If contract AB has arrived at time Nt  and the carrier 
status is { }Nz A=  (truck is empty and idle).   
 
Best Responses are calculated using 
 
1* 1*arg max[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ]
R
j j
b
b b c s p d
b
ξ ξ
∞
∈ −
∈
∫  
 
When the last shipment arrives, for each cost there is a price maximizes expected 
profits:  
 
1*
1*
1*
1*
1*
1*
3
( 3, 3) 0
2
( 2, 3 ) (3 2)*(1/ 4) 1/ 4
( 2, 2 ) (2 2)*(1/ 4) (2 2)*(1/ 2) 0
1
( 1, 3 ) (3 1)*(1/ 4) 1/ 2
( 1, 2 ) (2 1)*(1/ 4) (2 1)*(1/ 2) 3 / 4
0
(
N
N N
N
N N
N N
N
N N
N N
N
N
c
c b
c
c b
c b
c
c b
c b
c
c
π
π ε ε
π ε ε ε
π ε ε
π ε ε ε
π
=
= = =
=
= = − = − − ≈
= = − = − − + − − ≈
=
= = − = − − ≈
= = − = − − + − − ≈
=
1*
1*
0, 3 ) (3 0)*(1/ 4) 3 / 4
( 0, 2 ) (2 0)*(1/ 4) (2 0)*(1/ 2) 3 / 2
( 0, 1 ) (1 0)*(1/ 4) (1 0)*(1/ 2) (1 0)*(1/ 4) 1
N
N N
N N
b
c b
c b
ε ε
π ε ε ε
π ε ε ε ε
= = − = − − ≈
= = − = − − + − − ≈
= = − = − − + − − + − − ≈
 
Then, the prices for the last shipment are simply the best responses: 
 
( , ( ) 1) 2
( , ( ) 2) 3
N N N
N N N
b s AB c s
b s DA c s
ε
ε
= = = −
= = = −  
 
 
Let’s now assume that the truck is located at vertex A and idle at time 1Nt −  with 
corresponding 1 { }Nz A− = .  If contract AB has arrived at time 1Nt −  and the carrier status 
is 1 { }Nz A− =  (truck is empty and idle), the incremental cost is in this case is: 
 
1 ' 0 '
1 1 1 1 1( ) d(a, , ) d(a, , ) 1 0 1N N N N Nc s AB z t z t− − − − −= = − = − =  
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The term 1 1 1( | )N N Ns z −π  is calculated taking into account that 1 1 { ; }Nz A AB− =  and the 
future status is going to be { }Nz B= , then c( ) 2Ns AB= =  and c( ) 3Ns DA= = . For the 
former cost the expected profit is: 
 
1*
( ) c( )) ] 1/ 4N N NE b s AB Iξ [( − = = .  
 
For the latter cost the expected profit is:  
 
1*
( ) c( )) ] 0N N NE b s DA Iξ [( − = = .  
 
The term 1 1 1( | )N N Ns z −π  then is estimated as: 
 
1 1 1* 1
1 ( ) ( ) 1( | ) [ c( )| ) ]] (1/ 2) (1/ 4) (1/ 2) 0 1/ 8NN N N N N N Ns z E E b s z Iω ξ− −π = [( − = + =  
 
The term 1 0 1( | )N N Ns z −π  is calculated taking into account that 0 1 { }Nz A− =  and the future 
status is going to be { }Nz A= , then c( ) 1Ns AB= =  and c( ) 2Ns DA= = . For the former 
cost the expected profit is: 
 
1*
( ) c( )) ] 3 / 4N N NE b s AB Iξ [( − = = .  
 
For the latter cost the expected profit is:  
 
1*
( ) c( )) ] 1/ 4N N NE b s DA Iξ [( − = =  
 
The term 1 0 1( | )N N Ns z −π  then is estimated as: 
 
1 1* 0
1 ( ) ( ) 1( | ) [ c( )| ) ]] (1/ 2) 3 / 4 (1/ 2) (1/ 4) 1/ 2NN N N N N N Ns z E E b s z Iω ξ
1
− −π = [( − = + =  
 
Then, the cost 1* 1( )Nc s −  is: 
 
1*
1( ) 1 1/ 8 1/ 2 11/ 8Nc s AB− = = − + =  
 
The best response to this cost is a price:   
 
1 1( ) 2N Nb s AB ε− − = = −  
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Let’s now assume that the truck is located at vertex A and idle at time 1Nt −  with 
corresponding 1 { }Nz A− = .  If contract DA has arrived at time 1Nt − , the carrier status is 
1 { }Nz A− =  (truck is empty and idle), the incremental cost is in this case is: 
 
1 ' 0 '
1 1 1 1 1( ) d(a , , ) d(a , , ) 2 0 2N N N N Nc s DA z t z t− − − − −= = − = − =  
 
The term 1 1 1( | )N N Ns z −π  is calculated taking into account that 1 1 { ; }Nz A DA− =  and the 
future status is going to be { , }Nz D DA= , then c( ) 1Ns AB= =  and c( ) 0Ns DA= = . For 
the former cost the expected profit is: 
 
1*
( ) c( )) ] 3 / 4N N NE b s AB Iξ [( − = = .  
 
For the latter cost the expected profit is:  
 
1*
( ) c( )) ] 3 / 2N N NE b s DA Iξ [( − = = .  
 
The term 1 1 1( | )N N Ns z −π  then is estimated as: 
 
1 1 1* 1
1 ( ) ( ) 1( | ) [ c( )| ) ]] (1/ 2) (3 / 4) (1/ 2) (3 / 2) 9 / 8NN N N N N N Ns z E E b s z Iω ξ− −π = [( − = + =  
 
The term 1 0 1( | )N N Ns z −π  is calculated taking into account that 0 1 { }Nz A− =  and the future 
status is going to be { }Nz A= , then c( ) 1Ns AB= =  and c( ) 2Ns DA= = . For the former 
cost the expected profit is: 
 
1*
( ) c( )) ] 3 / 4N N NE b s AB Iξ [( − = = .  
 
For the latter cost the expected profit is:  
 
1*
( ) c( )) ] 1/ 4N N NE b s DA Iξ [( − = =  
 
The term 0 1( | )N N Ns z −π  then is estimated as: 
 
1 1* 0
1 ( ) ( ) 1( | ) [ c( )| ) ]] (1/ 2) 3 / 4 (1/ 2) (1/ 4) 1/ 2NN N N N N N Ns z E E b s z Iω ξ
1
− −π = [( − = + =  
 
Then, the cost 1* 1( )Nc s −  is: 
 
1*
1( ) 2 9 / 8 1/ 2 11/ 8Nc s DA− = = − + =  
 
The best response to this cost is a price:   
 
1 1( ) 2N Nb s DA ε− − = = −  
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The profits are: 
 
(2 11/ 8)*(1/ 4) (2 11/ 8)*(1/ 2) 5 / 32 10 / 32 15 / 32− + − = + =  
 
With a price of 3 ε− , profits are smaller: 
 
(3 11/ 8)*(1/ 4) 13/ 32− =  
 
This simple example illustrates the importance of the given or assumed price 
distribution when payments are similar to first price auction payments. . This is 
reflected in the prices starting from point A and with no outstanding contracts:   
 
( ) 2N Nb s AB ε= = −  and 1 1( ) 2N Nb s AB ε− − = = −  (price remains constant);  
 
( ) 3N Nb s DA ε= = −  and 1 1( ) 2N Nb s DA ε− − = = −  (price goes down).  
 
In addition, first price auction payment mechanisms may lead to inefficient ex-ante 
allocations since the carrier prices the contracts above the marginal cost, i.e. the lowest 
expected cost carrier does not serve the contract even though it would be ex-ante 
optimal to do so. The same phenomena was observed by Figliozzi et al. (2005) when 
simulating first and second price sequential auction marketplaces.  
